Strategic Interaction Among Firms in Output and Emission Markets: A Unified Framework

Francisco André and Luis M. Castro
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Luis M. Castro: ICEI, Universidad Complutense de Madrid

A chapter in Games in Management Science, 2020, pp 205-229 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Cap-and-trade (CAT) programs are nowadays a common tool used by authorities to regulate polluting emissions and tackle environmental problems such as Climate Change. In this chapter, we analyze the implications of firm’s strategic behavior in product and emission permit markets for the success of these policies. We survey the related literature focusing on the relevance of market structure and firms’ competition. We develop a simple but unifying setting to revisit some of the main academic results on the subject.

Keywords: Emissions trading; Oligopoly; Market interaction; Cournot model; Stackelberg model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:isochp:978-3-030-19107-8_12

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_12

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