A LQ Vaccine Communication Game
Alessandra Buratto (),
Luca Grosset () and
Bruno Viscolani ()
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Luca Grosset: University of Padova
Bruno Viscolani: University of Padova
A chapter in Games in Management Science, 2020, pp 353-367 from Springer
Abstract:
Abstract The vaccination issue is a crucial problem nowadays. We see the presence of an anti-vaccination movement, which takes actions to spread the idea that vaccines are ineffective and even dangerous. We propose a model for this public health problem using the differential game framework and aspire to help understanding the effectiveness of communication policies. One player of the game is the health-care system, which aims to minimize the number of unvaccinated people at minimum cost. The second player is a pharmaceutical firm, which produces and sells a given type of vaccine, and wants to maximize its profit. To pursue their objectives, the two players run suitable vaccination advertising campaigns. We study the open-loop Nash equilibrium advertising strategies of the two players and observe that the communication policy of the pharmaceutical firm helps the health-care system to decrease the number of unvaccinated people.
Keywords: Differential games; Vaccine communication policy; Advertising (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:isochp:978-3-030-19107-8_19
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_19
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