Noncooperative Supply Chain Scheduling
Zhi-Long Chen and
Nicholas G. Hall
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Zhi-Long Chen: University of Maryland
Nicholas G. Hall: Ohio State University
Chapter Chapter 9 in Supply Chain Scheduling, 2022, pp 549-659 from Springer
Abstract:
Abstract This chapter discusses the application of noncooperative solution methods, especially noncooperative game theory, to decentralized supply chain scheduling problems. We consider a wide variety of scheduling problems that have classically been modeled and analyzed from the perspective of a centralized decision maker. By viewing the jobs or resources within these applications as individual self-interested players, noncooperative supply chain scheduling games are defined over those problems. We consider games with complete information, first without and second with structural enhancements, as well as games where the players have private information which they may report untruthfully. Within private information games, we study mechanism design both without and with payments and illustrate various concepts of truthfulness that are established by deterministic or randomized mechanisms. Our analysis of these games applies all the main concepts of noncooperative games, from the perspective of finding equilibrium solutions and analyzing their quality.
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:isochp:978-3-030-90374-9_9
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-90374-9_9
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