Tempering Plurality Tyranny Effects in Social Choice

Raymond Bisdorff

Chapter Chapter 20 in Algorithmic Decision Making with Python Resources, 2022, pp 279-300 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In a social choice context, where decision objectives would match different political parties, Pareto efficient choice recommendations represent in fact multipartisan social choices that may judiciously deliver the primary selection in a two-stage election system. Our bipolar-valued outranking model is based on approvals-disapprovals of ‘at least as well evaluated as’ statements. A similar approach is put into practice with approval–disapproval voting systems. When converting such approval–disapproval voting ballots into corresponding performance records, we obtain a (−1, 0, 1)-valued evaluative voting system. We eventually show that in such an approval–disapproval voting system, the winner tends to be among the more or less multipartisan candidates.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-90928-4_20

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