Market Power

Makoto Tanaka, Antonio J. Conejo and Afzal S. Siddiqui
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Antonio J. Conejo: The Ohio State University
Afzal S. Siddiqui: Stockholm University

Chapter Chapter 5 in Economics of Power Systems, 2022, pp 155-195 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter considers market power observed in electric power markets. It describes a monopoly, a monopsony, and an oligopoly. We focus on a Cournot oligopoly model with simultaneous decision makers and a Stackelberg oligopoly model with sequential decision makers. An extended framework of a leader-follower oligopoly model is presented with multiple leaders including both producers and consumers who submit offer/bid prices strategically.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:isochp:978-3-030-92871-1_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-92871-1_5

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