 On the Effects of an Increase in the Number of Abaters in Pollution Abatement GamesLuca Colombo () and
Paola Labrecciosa ()
Chapter Chapter 10 in The Unaffordable Price of Static Decision-making Models, 2025, pp 173-193 from Springer Abstract: Abstract We study the effects of an increase in the number of abaters in pollution abatement games, first in a static, then in a dynamic (continuous-time) game. In both games, we assume that m countries/agents agree on taking action to reduce the stock of pollution, which is a public bad, whereas n − m $$n-m$$ countries free ride on the abatement levels of the abaters. Moreover, we assume that abaters can either coordinate on their contributions or not. In the static game, both in the coordination and the non-coordination scenario, an increase in m leads to a decrease in the stock of pollution and to an increase in social welfare. In the dynamic game, instead, both in the coordination and the non-coordination scenario, an increase in m may result in a higher steady-state stock of pollution and a lower social welfare, depending on the “business-as-usual” level of output. Keywords: Differential games; Pollution abatement; Mode of cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:isochp:978-3-031-88638-6_10 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-88638-6_10 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in International Series in Operations Research & Management Science from Springer |
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