A Vindication of Open-Loop Equilibria in Differential Games

Luca Lambertini ()
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Luca Lambertini: University of Bologna

Chapter Chapter 5 in The Unaffordable Price of Static Decision-making Models, 2025, pp 63-79 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter assesses the properties of open-loop equilibria to clarify their relevance. To this aim, it illustrates the classes of differential games which yield degenerate feedback strategies and equilibria under open-loop information. Then, it discusses the nature of the open-loop solutions of games in which such solutions are strongly time consistent, accounting also for the normative prescriptions one can draw on their basis.

Keywords: Open-loop equilibrium; Feedback equilibrium; Strong time consistency; Perfect games; C61; C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-88638-6_5

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