Emergence of Fair Offers in Ultimatum Game

Wanting Xiong (), Han Fu () and Yougui Wang ()
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Wanting Xiong: Beijing Normal University
Han Fu: Beijing Normal University
Yougui Wang: Beijing Normal University

A chapter in Artificial Economics and Self Organization, 2014, pp 107-118 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The dynamics of how fair offers come about in ultimatum game is studied via the method of agent-based modeling. Both fairness motive and adaptive learning are considered to be important in the fair behavior of human players in concerning literature. Here special attention is paid to situations where adaptive learning proposers encounter responders with either pure money concern or fairness motivation. The simulation results show that the interplay of adaptive learning participants yields a perfect sub-game equilibrium, but fair offers will be provided by proposers as long as a small proportion of responders play “tough” against unfair offer.

Keywords: Adaptive Learning; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Ultimatum Game; Monetary Loss; Human Player (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-319-00912-4_9

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-00912-4_9

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