Spontaneous Segregation of Agents Across Double Auction Markets

Aleksandra Alorić (), Peter Sollich and Peter McBurney
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Aleksandra Alorić: King’s College London, Strand
Peter Sollich: King’s College London, Strand
Peter McBurney: King’s College London, Strand

A chapter in Advances in Artificial Economics, 2015, pp 79-90 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we investigate the possibility of spontaneous segregation into groups of traders that have to choose among several markets. Even in the simplest case of two markets and Zero Intelligence traders, we are able to observe segregation effects below a critical value T c of the temperature T; the latter regulates how strongly traders bias their decisions towards choices with large accumulated scores. It is notable that segregation occurs even though the traders are statistically homogeneous. Traders can in principle change their loyalty to a market, but the relevant persistence times become long below T c .

Keywords: Persistence Time; Trading Period; Electronic Marketplace; Trading Price; Parking Spot (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-319-09578-3_7

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-09578-3_7

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