Preferences and Coalitions

Thomas Kämpke and Franz Josef Radermacher
Additional contact information
Thomas Kämpke: Research Institute for Applied Knowledge Processing (FAW/n)
Franz Josef Radermacher: University of Ulm

Chapter Chapter 9 in Income Modeling and Balancing, 2015, pp 141-171 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Redistribution of income is assumed to require the vote of at least 50 % of all individuals with income and each of them insists to be a winner from the redistribution. When inequality is to be increased in the interest of some, coalition partners must be found by compensation schemes. Compensation minimization is shown to lead to coalition partners being either a connected or a disconnected income group. When inequality reaches certain critical levels, disconnection becomes unavoidable. For one-parametric income distributions, the critical levels are denoted as bifurcation points. Values of bifurcation points are computed numerically for several one-parametric distributions. For income distributions with two or more parameters the bifurcation point is replaced by a bifurcation function.

Keywords: Loss Function; Income Distribution; Pareto Distribution; Lorenz Curve; Bifurcation Parameter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-319-13224-2_9

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319132242

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-13224-2_9

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().