Local Minority Game and Emergence of Efficient Dynamic Order

Hiroshi Sato () and Akira Namatame ()
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Hiroshi Sato: National Defense Academy
Akira Namatame: National Defense Academy

A chapter in Nonlinear Dynamics and Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, 2005, pp 71-85 from Springer

Abstract: Summary The Minority Games is a good examples of asymmetric coordination problems that are well suited to represent some economic situations. Normally agents play the game with all other agents and this type of game is called Global Minority Game (GMG). If agents play the game only with their neighbors it is called Local Minority Game (LMG). This distinction aims to introduce the limited ability of the agent to receive, decide, and act upon information in the course of interaction. An agent is modeled with its rules and they are updated and selected by natural selection. We propose the rule of give-and-take that is completely different from the conventional rules. With the rule of give-and-take, an agent gives to others when he receives a payoff. On the contrary, a conventional agent only pursues his benefit. We show that the simulation results of give-and-take agents are significantly better than that of selfish agents in both GMG and LMG. We also discuss spatio-temporal patterns and optimality in LMG and whether it can be obtained by evolutionary learning agents.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Mixed Strategy; Average Payoff; Neighborhood Size; Collective Decision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-540-27296-0_6

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-27296-8_6

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