Some Characterizations of Convex Games

Juan Enrique Martinez-Legaz

A chapter in Recent Advances in Optimization, 2006, pp 293-303 from Springer

Abstract: Summary Several characterizations of convexity for totally balanced games are presented. As a preliminary result, it is first shown that the core of any subgame of a nonnegative totally balanced game can be easily obtained from the maximum average value (MAV) function of the game. This result is then used to get a characterization of convex games in terms of MAV functions. It is also proved that a game is convex if and only if all of its marginal games are totally balanced.

Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-540-28258-7_18

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-28258-0_18

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