A Parametric Family of Mixed Coalitional Values

Francesc Carreras () and María Albina Puente ()
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Francesc Carreras: Polytechnic University of Catalonia
María Albina Puente: Polytechnic University of Catalonia

A chapter in Recent Advances in Optimization, 2006, pp 323-339 from Springer

Abstract: Summary We introduce here a family of mixed coalitional values. They extend the binomial semivalues to games endowed with a coalition structure, satisfy the property of symmetry in the quotient game and the quotient game property, generalize the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value introduced by Alonso and Fiestras and link and merge the Shapley value and the binomial semivalues. A computational procedure in terms of the multilinear extension of the original game is also provided and an application to political science is sketched.

Keywords: Parametric Family; Cooperative Game; Power Index; Coalition Structure; Simple Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-540-28258-7_20

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-28258-0_20

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