Signal Qualities, Order of Decisions, and Informational Cascades: Experimental Evidences

Sunichiro Sasaki
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Sunichiro Sasaki: Osaka University

A chapter in Developments on Experimental Economics, 2007, pp 137-142 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Informational cascades are said to occur if players ignore private signals by following an established pattern of actions that their predecessors have chosen as a result of Bayesian updating in a sequential decision-making problem. Anderson and Holt [1] confirmed that informational cascades certainly occur in the laboratory as Bikhchandani et al. [2] suggests. However, other experimental studies including Çelen and Kariv [3], Huck and Oechssler [4], Kraemer et al. [5], and Nöth and Weber [6] generally argue that subjects put more weight on their private sig-nals than the Bayesian model assumes.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-68660-6_10

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