The Mixed Effect of Voluntary Revelation: Evidence from Threshold Public Goods Game Experiments

Yasuyo Hamaguchi
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Yasuyo Hamaguchi: Nagoya City University

A chapter in Developments on Experimental Economics, 2007, pp 163-167 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract A number of experimental studies on public goods have shown that many people prefer to cooperate with others in the beginning, but this tendency diminishes as they interact with others in the course of the experiments (e.g. Andreoni [1]). Most experimental works on public goods games have so far tried to eliminate social interaction among subjects as much as possible. The purpose of such artificial procedures is to observe people’s selfish motivation uncontaminated by social norms. However, this sort of approach might be misleading if one wants to understand how people successfully produce or maintain a public good in reality.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Public Good; Threshold Level; Public Good Game; Voluntary Revelation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-68660-6_14

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