Design Science: A Prelude

Tatsuyoshi Saijo ()

A chapter in Developments on Experimental Economics, 2007, pp 119-127 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Recently, we find the rise of criticisms in the field of mechanism design, which is to design a mechanism or system for achieving social goals such as efficiency and equity in the distribution of goods and services. First of all, there is a criticism from experimentalists. In the verification of various mechanisms using human subjects in laboratories, these designed mechanisms do not necessarily function as prescribed. This fact itself is a criticism to not only this particular field, but also extending to economics as a whole. Departing from the initial stage of surprise with why theoretically expected results cannot be observed in laboratories, we are now entering the stage of determining why they do not function and what are the essential factors involved. Second criticism involves the presumptions in the theories themselves. Mechanism design has not paid sufficient attention to information exchanges between people, the cost of processing, and the selections of equilibrium concepts. What is questioned now is the real validity of frameworks themselves, on which the theories are nested. This report is, through exploratory works on issues of mechanism design, to contemplate hints of new approaches to the questions: what it means to design a mechanism; how to design them; and what shall be the next step economics needs to aim for.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Public Good; Public Choice; Emission Trading; Dominant Strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-540-68660-6_8

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-68660-6_8

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