Agent-Based Experimental Economics in Signaling Games

Adolfo López-Paredes (), Marta Posada (), Cesáreo Hernández and Javier Pajares ()
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Adolfo López-Paredes: Valladolid University
Marta Posada: Valladolid University
Cesáreo Hernández: Valladolid University
Javier Pajares: Valladolid University

Chapter 10 in Complexity and Artificial Markets, 2008, pp 121-129 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we built up an agent-based model inspired by human-subject behaviour in a signaling game experiment. The behavioural patterns of players observed in the experiment are classified in terms of attitudes, emotions and frugal and fast heuristics. We build up an agent-based model where artificial agents are endowed with these cognitive patterns by means of an endorsement scheme. We show the relationship between cognition and Multi-Agent interaction. We validate the model since it reproduces well the behavioural patterns observed in the human-subjects experiment.

Keywords: Bargaining Power; Quality Level; Payoff Matrix; Signaling Game; Behavioral Element (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-70556-7_10

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