Multiobjective Cooperative Games with Restrictions on Coalitions

Tetsuzo Tanino ()
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Tetsuzo Tanino: Osaka University

A chapter in Multiobjective Programming and Goal Programming, 2009, pp 167-174 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we consider a multiobjective cooperative game with restrictions on coalitions. We define the restricted game of the original multiobjective cooperative game and discuss its properties, namely inheritance of superadditivity and convexity under appropriate combinatorial structures on the feasible coalition system. We also study the core of the restricted game.

Keywords: Cooperative games; Core; Multiobjective optimization; Restrictions on coalitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-540-85646-7_16

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-85646-7_16

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