Pride and Prejudice on a Centralized Academic Labor Market
Philippe Caillou () and
Michele Sebag ()
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Philippe Caillou: Universite Paris Sud
Michele Sebag: Universite Paris Sud
Chapter Chapter 3 in Artificial Economics, 2009, pp 29-40 from Springer
Abstract:
Abstract The Academic Labor Market in France can be viewed as a constrained Stable Marriage problem, pairing universities and candidates according to their (elitist) preferences. A Multi-Agent based model, calibrated after the empirical evidence, is used to investigate how universities can recruit the best candidates with high confidence. Extensive simulations suggest that universities can be divided in four categories: top and medium universities have no difficulty in attracting the candidates they have selected, contrarily to good and bad universities. In this paper, a learning mechanism is presented: universities are allowed to tune their expectations depending on whether they did succeed to attract candidates in the previous recruitment rounds. The impact of over/under estimations is analyzed with respect to the hiring efficiency and quality.
Keywords: Multiagent System; Centralize Academic; Local Candidate; Stable Marriage; Hiring Process (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-642-02956-1_3
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02956-1_3
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