Robust Equal Representation
Nicola F. Maaser ()
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Nicola F. Maaser: University of Bayreuth
Chapter Chapter 3 in Decision-Making in Committees, 2010, pp 69-93 from Springer
Abstract:
Abstract This chapter investigates the robustness of square root rules for equal representation in two-tiered voting systems. When policy alternatives are non-binary and decisions are made by simple majority rule, Chap. 2 demonstrated that weight proportional to the square root of population size is approximately optimal, which may be interpreted as extending the scope of Penrose’s square root rule beyond the narrow limits of binary decision-making. However, in light of the normative character of this result, the simplifications used in the modeling of a complex real situation, such as, e.g., decision-making in the EU Council of Ministers, require special scrutiny. Specifically, the aim of this chapter is to conduct a ‘sensitivity analysis’ regarding the square root rule, addressing the following questions How does a ‘simple’ voting rule that derives directly from constituency sizes perform compared to more sophisticated rules that use standard power indices as reference points? What is the fair voting rule under supermajority rules at the top tier? How does the fair voting rule react to heterogeneity across constituencies?
Keywords: Ideal Point; Median Voter; Vote Rule; Winning Coalition; Vote Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-642-04153-2_3
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-04153-2_3
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