A Lot Sizing Game with Uncertain Demand

Julia Drechsel ()

Chapter Chapter 6 in Cooperative Lot Sizing Games in Supply Chains, 2010, pp 81-85 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In Chap. 5, we presented an economic lot sizing game where several players face dynamic demand that should be satisfied while making joint orders. Joint orders can reduce total costs because fixed ordering costs can be shared among the partners. In the following sections, we will introduce an extension of the before presented ELS game: In many practical situations, demand cannot be forecasted with certainty. Thus, a model that could handle uncertainties might be an interesting new feature for the ELS game.

Keywords: Cost Share; Master Problem; Grand Coalition; Stability Constraint; Uncertain Demand (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-642-13725-9_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-13725-9_6

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