Reinforcement Learning of Heterogeneous Private Agents in a Macroeconomic Policy Game

Mahdi Hemmati (), Masoud Nili () and Nasser Sadati ()
Additional contact information
Mahdi Hemmati: Sharif University of Technology
Masoud Nili: Sharif University of Technology
Nasser Sadati: Sharif University of Technology

A chapter in Progress in Artificial Economics, 2010, pp 215-226 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract A repeated inflation-unemployment game within the linear-quadratic framework of Barro and Gordon is studied assuming that the government would like to cheat optimally and the finite heterogeneous population of private agents attempts to learn the government’s targets using a reinforcement learning algorithm. Private agents are heterogeneous in their initial expectations of inflation rate but are assumed to utilize an identical anticipatory reinforcement learning process, namely Q-learning. In our heterogeneous setting, the only way for the private agents to achieve a zero value for their loss function, is for all of them to correctly anticipate the Nash equilibrium. It is of particular significance that such a solution requires a convergence of expectations across an initially heterogeneous population. Computer simulations have been conducted using different tuning parameters to investigate the convergence of our proposed model of learning process to Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Reinforcement Learning; Learning Model; Repeated Game; Private Agent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-642-13947-5_18

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783642139475

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-13947-5_18

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().