Co-evolutionary Agents in Combinatorial Sealed-bid Auctions for Spectrum Licenses Markets

Asuncion Mochon (), Yago Saez, Jose Luis Gomez-Barroso and Pedro Isasi
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Asuncion Mochon: UNED and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Yago Saez: UNED and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Jose Luis Gomez-Barroso: UNED and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Pedro Isasi: UNED and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

A chapter in Progress in Artificial Economics, 2010, pp 53-63 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Allocating scarce resources is a difficult duty governments must face. Furthermore, when participants exhibit complex preference structures (substitutes and complements) this task is even trickier. Combinatorial auctions are a good alternative for solving this problem. In this work we have developed a simulator of a combinatorial first-price sealed-bid auction. The bidding behaviour has been simulated by the application of co-evolutionary dynamics in an agent-based model. This model assumes independent bidders with bounded rationality trying to maximize profits. Finally, the simulations have been tested for two environments that involve the sale of spectrum licenses (digital dividend). These techniques are a helpful tool to support governments taking decisions in the awarding process.

Keywords: Combinatorial Auction; Spectrum License; Bidding Behaviour; Auction Format; Winner Determination Problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-642-13947-5_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-13947-5_5

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