Model

Milan Horniaček ()
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Milan Horniaček: Comenius University

Chapter Chapter 2 in Cooperation and Efficiency in Markets, 2011, pp 9-19 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter we describe our model of a market with strategically behaving agents on both sides. First, we characterize the stage game between the firms in the model. Then, we proceed to the formulation of the countable infinite repeated game with discounting of payoffs. In Sect. 2.3 we define the solution concepts that we apply to the repeated game: SRPE and SSPE.

Keywords: Pure Strategy; Fixed Cost; Grand Coalition; Repeated Game; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-642-19763-5_2

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-19763-5_2

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