A Model of Peering Among VoIP Firms

Philipp Servatius ()
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Philipp Servatius: Université de Fribourg

Chapter Chapter 5 in Network Economics and the Allocation of Savings, 2012, pp 179-234 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter we model certain aspects of the interaction among VoIP firms. To be precise, we focus on the re-routing problem as presented in Sect. 4.4. To this end, we establish a coalitional game where the VoIP firms as players can achieve gains through cooperation. These gains result from the long distance fees that are dropped under peering agreements, and we incorporate elements of network theory to model the peering relationships. Because the characteristic function takes into account the peering network, what we called a game above is actually a communication situation, see Sect. 3.3.

Keywords: Market Share; Weight System; Bargaining Solution; Bargaining Problem; Coalitional Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-642-21096-9_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-21096-9_5

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