Concluding Remarks, Recommendations, and Future Research

Philipp Servatius ()
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Philipp Servatius: Université de Fribourg

Chapter Chapter 7 in Network Economics and the Allocation of Savings, 2012, pp 269-272 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In Part I of this study selected concepts from the theory of games and from network theory are presented. It contains no new results, but some of the proofs, especially in the section on cooperative games, and the respective solution concepts have been reworked extensively. Also, some alternative definitions are provided. Doing so, we aim to give the reader a thorough understanding and intuition on the concepts at hand, as opposed to the often rigourous and overly brief exposure in the original literature. Our exposition is, hopefully, easier accessible due to the use of more basic mathematical tools and more elaborate consideration in many instances.

Keywords: Cooperative Game; Allocation Rule; Efficient Network; Access Charge; Core Allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-642-21096-9_7

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-21096-9_7

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