Studying the Distribution of Strategies in the Two-Scenario Snowdrift Game

Edgardo Bucciarelli (), Shu-Heng Chen (), Aurora Ascatigno () and Alfredo Colantonio ()
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Edgardo Bucciarelli: University of Chieti-Pescara
Shu-Heng Chen: National Chengchi University
Aurora Ascatigno: University of Chieti-Pescara
Alfredo Colantonio: International Telematic University Uninettuno

A chapter in Digital (Eco) Systems and Societal Challenges, 2024, pp 407-428 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The Snowdrift Game, a commonly adopted model for studying cooperation in a competitive scenario, serves as a framework in this work. Computer simulations are used to investigate how variations in the payoff structure affect the strategies adopted by players. Two scenarios with distinct payoff parameters are explored. Players engage in strategies aligned with game theory principles. The distribution of these strategies is examined through an ecological perspective. The findings of the work are in line with the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, implying a higher prevalence of cooperation in the scenario offering greater rewards for mutual cooperation. These results demonstrate the significant influence of payoff manipulation on cooperative behaviour within the game.

Keywords: Social dilemmas; Computational economics; Strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnichp:978-3-031-75586-6_22

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-75586-6_22

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