Considering Short and Long Term Fairness in Recurrent Auctions with an Application to Collaborative Rostering

T. Heller and S. Velten ()
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T. Heller: Fraunhofer Institute for Industrial Mathematics ITWM
S. Velten: Fraunhofer Institute for Industrial Mathematics ITWM

Chapter Chapter 42 in Operations Research Proceedings 2022, 2023, pp 349-355 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Collaborative duty rostering can increase the satisfaction of employees in healthcare. For the acceptance of a final rostering, a fair selection of included wishes is essential. As in rostering problems various constraints must be respected, it is generally not possible to accept all bids (wishes for a single free time slot) in a planning period and fairness is important. In this paper we present a weighted Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism approach where past auction results are incorporated by a fairness factor and where the underlying winner determination problem is given by a hitting set problem (HSP). We present numerical results of simulation runs over several planning periods.

Keywords: Auctions/competitive bidding; Game theory; Health care (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-24907-5_42

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