Manipulating Waiting-Plus-Detour-Time Mechanisms for Pickup and Delivery Problems

Martin Damyanov Aleksandrov ()
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Martin Damyanov Aleksandrov: Freie Universität Berlin

Chapter Chapter 53 in Operations Research Proceedings 2022, 2023, pp 443-449 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We consider routing problems where agents have preferences over pickup and delivery travel options. We look at the class of mechanisms that maximise social welfare. We study computing outcomes with such mechanisms. We also show that agents can manipulate such mechanisms. In response, we study computing pure Nash equilibria induced by such mechanisms. Finally, we analyse the price of anarchy for such mechanisms, which quantifies the welfare loss in an equilibrium.

Keywords: Logistics; Game theory; Pure Nash equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnopch:978-3-031-24907-5_53

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-24907-5_53

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