Stackelberg Attack on Protocol Fee Governance

Alexandre Hajjar ()
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Alexandre Hajjar: Buttery Good Games

Chapter Chapter 11 in Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy, 2024, pp 215-230 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We establish a Stackelberg attack by Liquidity Providers against Governance of an AMM, leveraging forking and commitments through a Grim Forker smart contract. We produce a dynamic, block-by-block model of AMM reserves and trading volume in the presence of competing forks, derive equilibrium conditions in the presence of protocol fees, and analyze Stackelberg equilibria with smart contract moves.

Keywords: Commitments; Stackelberg attacks; Smart contracts; Algorithmic game theory; DeFi; AMM; Governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnopch:978-3-031-68974-1_11

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-68974-1_11

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