Adaptive Proof-of-Stake Governance: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Consensus Mechanisms

Frédéric Mirindi () and Derrick Mirindi ()
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Frédéric Mirindi: Department of Economics
Derrick Mirindi: Morgan State University, School of Architecture and Planning

A chapter in Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy, 2026, pp 121-144 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Current Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus mechanisms are limited by static parameter designs that cannot adjust to changing network conditions. Consequently, substantial misalignments emerge between theoretical security guarantees and practical network performance. Therefore, this paper proposes an adaptive PoS governance framework based on dynamic game theory. We represent validator actions as evolving Bayesian games under shifting constraints. Thus, we establish clear rules for a stable Nash equilibrium, ensuring Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT). The framework includes real-time adaptation. For instance, we use Gini coefficient monitoring, performance-based validator selection, and adaptive slashing policies, all studied with stochastic differential equations. Our analysis shows adaptive feedback maintains incentive compatibility and improves both decentralization and security. Furthermore, Monte Carlo simulations applied to PoS networks confirm remarkable results. Specifically, adaptive systems converge over 300% faster, reduce volatility by 95%, and fully achieve decentralization goals. In contrast, static mechanisms fail in these areas. Additionally, stress tests in eight adversarial scenarios prove the system’s robustness; adaptive PoS consistently achieves superior performance ratings compared to the lower ratings observed for static models. Our approach offers reliable tools for building strong protocols and informing regulatory design in decentralized finance.

Keywords: Adaptive Proof-of-Stake; Game; Theoretic Consensus; Blockchain Governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnopch:978-3-032-13377-9_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-13377-9_6

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