Ordering and Pricing Decisions Considering Capital Constraint and Loss Aversion

Jinfeng Liu (), Guang Song () and Juan Li ()
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Jinfeng Liu: Beijing Jiaotong University
Guang Song: Beijing Jiaotong University
Juan Li: Beijing Jiaotong University

A chapter in IEIS 2023, 2024, pp 1-10 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The problem of difficult and expensive financing for small and medium-sized enterprises is not only a problem for enterprise operations, but also a difficult point for scholars to study. Based on the Stackelberg game and prospect theory, this paper constructs a supply chain model composed of a retailer, characterized by loss aversion and financial constraints, a risk-neutral manufacturer, which is a core enterprise with strong capital in the supply chain, and a investor, using reverse induction method to solve the optimal order quantity and optimal wholesale price under the mixed model of delayed payment and equity financing, and also studies the influence of parameters.

Keywords: Stackelberg game; prospect theory; mixed model of delayed payment and equity financing; optimal order quantity; optimal wholesale price (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnopch:978-981-97-4137-3_1

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-97-4137-3_1

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