Price of Anarchy in the Link Destruction (Adversary) Model

Lasse Kliemann ()
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Lasse Kliemann: Kiel University

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2014, 2016, pp 285-291 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this model of network formation, players anticipate the destruction of one link, which is chosen according to a known probability distribution. Their cost is the cost for building links plus the expected number of other players to which connection will be lost as a result of the link destruction. We consider different equilibrium concepts (Nash equilibrium, pairwise Nash equilibrium, pairwise stability) and two different ways in which the probability distribution depends on the network.

Keywords: Network formation; Robustness; Price of anarchy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-28697-6_40

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