Management Coordination for Multi-Participant Supply Chains Under Uncertainty

Kefah Hjaila (), José M. Laínez-Aguirre (), Luis Puigjaner () and Antonio Espuña ()
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Kefah Hjaila: Universitat Politécnica de Catalunya
José M. Laínez-Aguirre: University at Buffalo
Luis Puigjaner: Universitat Politécnica de Catalunya
Antonio Espuña: Universitat Politécnica de Catalunya

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2015, 2017, pp 437-443 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract A game decision support tool is developed to suggest the best conditions for the coordination contract between different stakeholders with conflictive objectives in a multi-participant Supply Chain (SC). On the base of dynamic games, the interaction between the involved stakeholders is modeled as a non-cooperative non-zero-sum Stackelberg’s game under the leading role of one of the partners. The leader designs the first game move (price offered) based on its optimal conditions and taking into consideration the uncertain conditions of the follower. Consequently, the follower responds by designing the second move (quantity offered at this price) based on its best current/uncertain conditions, until the Stackelbergs payoff matrix is built. The expected follower payoffs are obtained taking into consideration the risks associated with the uncertain nature of the 3rd party suppliers. Results are verified on a case study consisting of different providers SC around a client SC in a global decentralized scenario. The results show improvements in the current/expected individual profits in the SCs of both leader and follower when compared with their standalone cases.

Keywords: Supply Chain; Transfer Price; Stackelberg Game; Uncertain Condition; Stackelberg Solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-42902-1_59

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