The Existence of Equilibria in the Leader-Follower Hub Location and Pricing Problem

Dimitrije D. Čvokić (), Yury A. Kochetov () and Aleksandr V. Plyasunov ()
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Dimitrije D. Čvokić: University of Banja Luka
Yury A. Kochetov: Sobolev Institute of Mathematics
Aleksandr V. Plyasunov: Sobolev Institute of Mathematics

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2015, 2017, pp 539-544 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We propose a model where two competitors, a Leader and a Follower, are sequentially creating their hub and spoke networks and setting prices. The existence of the unique Stackelberg and Nash pricing equilibria is shown. On the basis of these results we give the conclusion about existence of the profit maximising solution for the Leader.

Keywords: Price Equilibrium; Price Problem; Stackelberg Game; Bilevel Optimization; Bilevel Optimization Problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-319-42902-1_73

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-42902-1_73

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