Designing Inspector Rosters with Optimal Strategies

Stephan Schwartz (), Thomas Schlechte () and Elmar Swarat ()
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Stephan Schwartz: Zuse Institute Berlin
Thomas Schlechte: Zuse Institute Berlin
Elmar Swarat: Zuse Institute Berlin

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2016, 2018, pp 217-223 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We consider the problem of enforcing a toll on a transportation network with limited inspection resources. We formulate a game theoretic model to optimize the allocation of the inspectors, taking the reaction of the network users into account. The model includes several important aspects for practical operation of the control strategy, such as duty types for the inspectors. In contrast to a formulation in Borndörfer et al. (Networks, 65, 312–328, [1]) using flows to describe the users’ strategies we choose a path formulation and identify dominated user strategies to significantly reduce the problem size. Computational results suggest that our approach is better suited for practical instances.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-319-55702-1_30

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-55702-1_30

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