Aggregate Game and International Fishery with Several Countries

Koji Okuguchi ()
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Koji Okuguchi: Gifu Shotoku Gakuen University

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2005, 2006, pp 461-466 from Springer

Abstract: 3. Conclusion In this paper we have been able to derive the closed loop solution for international fishery with several countries engaged in fishing to maximize their total discounted utilities over finite fishing periods. Our international fishery model is a generalized version of the well known model of international fish war between two countries. Recognizing that at each stage of maximization, the equilibrium conditions are those of aggregate games, we have derived rather easily the optimal harvesting rates for the first period for any length of harvesting periods, which enables us to determine the optimal harvesting rates for all subsequent periods.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Fish Stock; Dynamic Programming Approach; Loop Solution; Logarithmic Utility Function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-32539-5_72

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