Dominance and Equilibria in the Path Player Game

Anita Schöbel and Silvia Schwarze ()
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Anita Schöbel: University of Göttingen
Silvia Schwarze: University of Göttingen

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2005, 2006, pp 489-494 from Springer

Abstract: Summary This paper investigates the relation between Nash equilibria and non-dominated solutions in a special class of games, namely path player games. Nash equilibria are situations in a game where none of the players is able to obtain a better outcome by himself. On the other hand, a situation is non-dominated if there does not exist a situation which is really better for one of the players, and at least the same for all others. We provide two classes of path player games in which each non-dominated situation is a Nash equilibrium, and one class in which also the reverse is true.

Keywords: Cost Function; Nash Equilibrium; Game Network; Allocation Game; Network Resource Allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-540-32539-0_77

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-32539-5_77

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