Exit in Duopoly Under Uncertainty and Incomplete Information

Makoto Goto () and Takahiro Ono ()
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Makoto Goto: Waseda University
Takahiro Ono: Waseda University

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2005, 2006, pp 513-518 from Springer

Abstract: Conclusion We have shown, by assuming for simplicity that market uncertainty is lower, that in the incomplete information model, there is reversal of exit order in spite of the exclusion of gap equilibrium. Therefore, equilibrium is influenced not only by market uncertainty but also by uncertainty of information about the competitor. While we assume that the strategy is a continuous and increasing function, there may be a more natural assumption. Also, considering constraint of the distribution function may ensure the uniqueness of the best response.

Keywords: Incomplete Information; Real Option; Geometric Brownian Motion; Market Uncertainty; Real Option Approach (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-540-32539-0_81

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-32539-5_81

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