Complexity of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Games

Juliane Dunke ()
Additional contact information
Juliane Dunke: Massachusetts Institute of Technology

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2006, 2007, pp 45-51 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Game theory in general and the concept of Nash equilibrium in particular have lately come under increased scrutiny by theoretical computer scientists. Computing a mixed Nash equilibrium is a case in point. For many years, one of the most important open problems was the complexity of computing a mixed Nash equilibrium in games with only two players. Only recently was it solved by a sequence of significant papers (Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2006), Daskalakis et.al. (2006), Chen and Deng (2005), Daskalakis and Papadimitriou (2005), and Chen and Deng (2006)).

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Truth Assignment; Congestion Game; Noncooperative Game; Pure Nash Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-540-69995-8_7

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783540699958

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-69995-8_7

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Operations Research Proceedings from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().