Computing the Value of Information in Quadratic Stochastic Decision Problems

Sigifredo Laengle ()
Additional contact information
Sigifredo Laengle: Universidad de Chile

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2007, 2008, pp 179-184 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We present a game in which, if one of the players improves his payoff upon obtaining more information, the other player’s payoff worsens in such a way that there is a net social loss due to having more information. How can we ensure this does not occur? The results of this paper are (1) the mathematical expression of the (social) value of information in a quadratic non-cooperative game, and (2) the conditions that ensure the social value of information is non-negative.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Equilibrium Solution; Closed Subspace; Additional Observation; Stochastic Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-540-77903-2_28

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783540779032

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-77903-2_28

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Operations Research Proceedings from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().