Non-Negativity of Information Value in Games, Symmetry and Invariance

Sigifredo Laengle () and Fabián Flores-Bazán ()
Additional contact information
Sigifredo Laengle: Universidad de Chile
Fabián Flores-Bazán: Universidad de Concepción

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2010, 2011, pp 59-64 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In the context of optimization problems of an agent, having more information without additional cost is always beneficial is a classic result by D. Blackwell (1953). Nevertheless, in the context of strategic interaction this is not always true. Under what conditions more information is (socially) beneficial in games? Existing literature varies between two ends: on the one hand, we find works that calculate the information value of particular cases not always easy to generalize; on the other hand, there are also abstract studies which make difficult the analysis of more concrete applications. In order to fill this gap, we calculated the information value in the general case of constrained quadratic games in the framework of Hilbert spaces. As a result of our work we found a close relationship between the symmetry of information and the mathematical property of invariance (of subspaces). Such property is the base to calculate the information value and demonstrating its non-negativity. Such results improve the understanding of general conditions that assure the non-negativity of information value. In the immediate thing, this work can be extended to the study of other payoff functions with more general constraints.

Keywords: Hilbert Space; Team Operator; Strategic Interaction; Strategy Space; Interaction Operator (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-642-20009-0_10

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783642200090

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-20009-0_10

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Operations Research Proceedings from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().