A Fresh Look on the Battle of Sexes Paradigm

Rudolf Avenhaus () and Thomas Krieger ()
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Rudolf Avenhaus: Universität der Bundeswehr München, Fakultät für Informatik
Thomas Krieger: ITIS GmbH an der Universität der Bundeswehr München, Fakultät für Informatik

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2010, 2011, pp 71-76 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract If one tries to model real conflict situations with the help of non-cooperative normal form games, it may happen that strategy combinations have to be considered which are totally unrealistic in practice but which, however may be taken into account in equilibrium with positive probability. In this paper the battle of sexes paradigm is considered which is the most simple game owning this unrealistic feature. It is shown that a slight modification of the rules of this game remedies the problem: The game is repeated as long as the absurd strategy combination is realized, but at most n times. It turns out that the expected run length of this new game is smaller than two. In other words, the unrealistic feature of the original battle of sexes paradigm can be removed by a slight and in its consequences not important modification of the rules of the game.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Normal Form; Recursive Relation; Pure Strategy; Positive Probability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-642-20009-0_12

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-20009-0_12

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