Coordination by Contracts in Decentralized Product Design Processes – Towards Efficient Compliance with Recycling Rates in the Automotive Industry

Kerstin Schmidt (), Thomas Volling () and Thomas S. Spengler ()
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Kerstin Schmidt: Technische Universität Braunschweig
Thomas Volling: Technische Universität Braunschweig
Thomas S. Spengler: Technische Universität Braunschweig

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2010, 2011, pp 435-440 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Design processes in the automotive industry are distributed over various companies. If fixed-price contracts are used to coordinate such collaborations, inefficiencies in the design process occur due to existing uncertainties and differing objectives of the partners. To make decentralized design processes more flexible and to reduce inefficiencies, we introduce the conceptual design of incentive contracts and apply it to the case of the compliance with recycling rates in the automotive industry.

Keywords: Design Process; Automotive Industry; Supply Chain Management; Transfer Payment; Development Cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-642-20009-0_69

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-20009-0_69

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