Centralized Super-Efficiency and Yardstick Competition – Incentives in Decentralized Organizations

Armin Varmaz, Andreas Varwig () and Thorsten Poddig
Additional contact information
Armin Varmaz: University of Freiburg
Andreas Varwig: University of Bremen
Thorsten Poddig: University of Bremen

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2010, 2011, pp 53-58 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Due to deficient instruments of performance management, decentralized organizations often produce inefficiently. Promising approaches to dynamic incentives and performance management have recently been developed based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). These, however, are not yet able to account for the specific needs of central performance management. We develop two new intra-organizational performance measures for defining dynamic incentive schemes and increasing overall performance. For suggestive evidence we evaluate the performances of 11 bank branches.

Keywords: Data Envelopment Analysis; Performance Management; Data Envelopment Analysis Model; Central Management; Payment Scheme (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-642-20009-0_9

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783642200090

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-20009-0_9

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Operations Research Proceedings from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().