Honesty in Budgetary Reporting - an Experimental Study

Arleta Mietek () and Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger ()
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Arleta Mietek: Department of Statistics and Operations Research
Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger: Department of Statistics and Operations Research

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2011, 2012, pp 205-210 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In the experiment we investigate how an agent’s participation in the budgetary process influences his willingness to truthful communication of private information, if there are financial incentives to misrepresentation. The paper focuses on the trade-off between the agent’s preferences for wealth and honesty. The objective is to find and examine the relation between social preferences and honesty in managerial reporting.

Keywords: Social Preference; Agency Theory; Managerial Reporting; Cooperative Agent; Organizational Slack (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-642-29210-1_33

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-29210-1_33

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