Economic Games as Estimators

Michael Zargham (), Krzysztof Paruch () and Jamsheed Shorish
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Michael Zargham: Vienna University of Economics and Business
Krzysztof Paruch: Vienna University of Economics and Business

A chapter in Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy, 2020, pp 125-142 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Discrete event games are discrete time dynamical systems whose state transitions are discrete events caused by actions taken by agents within the game. The agents’ objectives and associated decision rules need not be known to the game designer in order to impose structure on a game’s reachable states. Mechanism design for discrete event games is accomplished by declaring desirable invariant properties and restricting the state transition functions to conserve these properties at every point in time for all admissible actions and for all agents, using techniques familiar from state-feedback control theory. Building upon these connections to control theory, a framework is developed to equip these games with estimation properties of signals which are private to the agents playing the game. Token bonding curves are presented as discrete event games and numerical experiments are used to investigate their signal processing properties with a focus on input-output response dynamics.

Keywords: Estimation; Dynamic games; Cryptoeconomic systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-53356-4_8

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