Cooperators Are Faster but Not More Accurate in Social Exchange Decisions Compared to Defectors
Adam Karbowski (),
Jerzy Osiński and
Bartlomiej Wisnicki
Additional contact information
Adam Karbowski: SGH Warsaw School of Economics
Jerzy Osiński: University of Warsaw
Chapter Chapter 1 in Advances in Quantitative Economic Research, 2022, pp 1-13 from Springer
Abstract:
Abstract In this study, we focus on decision-making in social exchange. In particular, we test the effectiveness (measured by speed and accuracy of decisions) of the decision-making in social exchange. Experimental results show that persons who cooperate in a prisoner’s dilemma game (cooperators) are faster but not more accurate at solving the social contract version of the Wason selection task compared to persons selecting in a prisoner’s dilemma game a defection strategy (defectors). Differences between cooperators and defectors in speed or accuracy of decision-making have not been observed in the abstract version of the Wason selection task. The obtained results provide empirical support to the claim that the social exchange heuristic works as an optimizing tool of the human mind.
Keywords: Social cooperation; Social exchange; Decision-making; Behavioral economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:prbchp:978-3-030-98179-2_1
Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783030981792
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-98179-2_1
Access Statistics for this chapter
More chapters in Springer Proceedings in Business and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().