Optimization of Control in the Management of Transport Business Objects Using the Game Theory Methods
Alexander Vyacheslavovich Gudkov and
Ruslan Yakovlevich Vakulenko
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Alexander Vyacheslavovich Gudkov: Glinka Nizhny Novgorod State Conservatoire
Ruslan Yakovlevich Vakulenko: Nizhny Novgorod State Linguistic University named after N. A. Dobrolyubov
A chapter in Challenges and Solutions in the Digital Economy and Finance, 2022, pp 207-221 from Springer
Abstract:
Abstract The purpose of the article is a theoretical substantiation of optimization of control and reduction of costs for its implementation by introducing mathematical methods based on the Game theory. The problem of effective control is relevant for the management of all organizations, without exception, in any field of activity. In the control function realization, one of the main problems is its optimality from the point of view of minimizing indicators of violation by employees of the regulations, rules and standards of the organization. Due to the fact that the control is an expensive management tool, it directly affects the expenses and cost of the product produced by the organization. This article explores the mathematical methods for reducing violations by employees, involved in the transport business, of regulations by using the optimal choice of the frequency of the control activities, implemented by the methods of the Game theory and, as a consequence, reducing the cost of the control for the manager. The novelty of the research is the fact that for the first time various formulations of the control problems and options for their solution are considered, from which the most effective from the point of view of sustainability, that is, a stable decrease of the indicators of violations of the production regulations by employees, is selected. The article also provides a basic adaptation of the Game theory tools, which are necessary for solving the control problems.
Keywords: Management; Game theory; Transport business management; Control; Checking; Equilibrium of collective action; Nash equilibrium; Control strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:prbchp:978-3-031-14410-3_22
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-14410-3_22
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