Wholesale Price Contract and Quantity Discount Contract Under Competition with Various Games

Qin Jiabao, Lei Quansheng and He Yezi
Additional contact information
Qin Jiabao: School of Automation, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
Lei Quansheng: School of Automation, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
He Yezi: School of International Studies, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications

Chapter Chapter 19 in Recent Developments in Data Science and Business Analytics, 2018, pp 175-182 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This article analyzes supply chain contracts in a two-tier supply chain system consisting of two competing manufacturers and one retailer. The two manufacturers compete for the order of the only retailer in the downstream. While the manufacturer 1 and the retailer adopted the quantity discount contract and therefore playing the Stackelberg game between them, the other manufacturer – manufacturer 2 adopted a wholesale price contract with the retailer, and playing a bargaining game between them. We find that in the competitive scenario with various games, the quantity discount contract can further expand its superiority and effectively coordinate the supply chain with the presence of the Stackelberg-leader advantage. Quantity discount contract is more advantageous than wholesale price contract.

Keywords: Bargaining game; Stackelberg game; Quantity discount; Wholesale price contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:prbchp:978-3-319-72745-5_19

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319727455

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-72745-5_19

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Proceedings in Business and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().